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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOES TO WAR
Cass R. Sunstein*
Consider the following cases:
(i) The President initiates military action against Iraq in 2003, contending that the best evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein "aided

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September i i, 2001."
(2) The President initiates military action against Iran in 2006, contending that the Central Intelligence Agency can show that Iran's government has "harbored" members of al Qaeda since 1999.1
(3)The President initiates military action against North Korea,
contending that the Central Intelligence Agency can show that North
Korea's government has "assisted" al Qaeda financially since 2003.
(4)The President authorizes the use of force to arrest and detain
citizens of France, who are brought to the United States and imprisoned because they knowingly provided significant financial assistance
to organizations that supported al Qaeda in 2000.2
(5)The President detains an American citizen captured at an
American airport, contending that the citizen "aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September ii, 2001." He plans to detain the
citizen indefinitely.
(6) The President orders the killing of an American citizen at an
American airport, contending that the citizen "aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September Ii, 2001."
Is there a body of principles that can help to evaluate the legality of
3
these actions under the 200i Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF)? I suggest that there is, and that it can be found in a single
area: administrative law. Most obviously, presidential action under the
200i AUMF, or any imaginable AUMF, should be subject to the prin* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to the Herbert Fried Fund for financial support.
Thanks to Patrick Gudridge, Eric Posner, David Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable
comments; special thanks to Adrian Vermeule for extended discussions.
I See Dan Eggen, 9111 Panel Links Al Qaeda, Iran, WASH. POST, June 26, 2004, at A12

("While it found no operational ties between al Qaeda and Iraq, the commission investigating the
Sept. Ii, 200 1, attacks has concluded that Osama bin Laden's terrorist network had long-running
contacts with Iraq's neighbor and historic foe, Iran.").
2 Cf. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting the
government's assertion of authority to detain a "little old lady in Switzerland" who unwittingly
writes a check to a front that finances al Qaeda activities).
3 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,

15 Stat. 224 (2001).
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ciples that have emerged in the wake of the Supreme Court's extraordinarily influential decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 4 As we shall see, the logic of Chevron
5
applies to the exercise of executive authority in the midst of war.
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith make an important
contribution to our understanding of presidential power during wartime. 6 But I believe that their analysis would be clearer, simpler, and
more straightforward if they focused more systematically on administrative law principles. 7 A special advantage of this approach is that it
imposes the right incentives on all those involved, including Congress.
My general conclusion is that the President should have a great
deal of discretion in interpreting ambiguities in the AUMF, subject to a
constraint of reasonableness. The principal qualification is that if the
President is infringing on constitutionally sensitive interests, the
AUMF must be construed narrowly, whatever the President says. Under this framework, the President plainly has the authority to act in
cases (i), (2), and (4) above. He lacks that authority in case (6). For
reasons to be explored, cases (3) and (5) are extremely difficult.
This framework, rooted in administrative law, is properly used
both by reviewing courts (subject to any justiciability constraints8 ) and
by members of the Executive Branch advising the President about the
legality of proposed courses of action. Indeed, this framework furnishes the appropriate principles not only for understanding any authorization for the use of force, but also for evaluating all exercises of
presidential power when Congress has authorized the President to protect the nation's security. 9

4 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

5 On some of the complexities here, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2o0o).
6 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2oo5).
7 Difficult questions lurk in the background of their analysis. For example, why, exactly, do
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith place such emphasis on the laws of war? One possibility is
that they believe that Congress legislates against the baseline of the laws of war and therefore
ought to be presumed aware of them. This view seems to me artificial. A more promising possibility is that Professors Bradley and Goldsmith believe that the laws of war provide an interpretive resource whether or not Congress is aware of them - that they furnish a set of principles,
vindicated by tradition, against which authorizations for the use of force should be understood.
On this view, the laws of war discipline and improve interpretation of any authorization to use
force. This second view seems plausible and thus justifies attention, in hard cases, to the laws of
war; but it is best to start with statutory text and more familiar administrative law principles.
8 These constraints include the political question doctrine, see Goldwater v. Carter, 446 U.S.
996 (979), and doctrines governing reviewability, see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Dickson v. Sec'y of Def., 68 F.3 d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
9 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (construing the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-17o6 (1976 & Supp. i1)).
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I. PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN CHEVRON'S SHADOW

Chevron creates a two-step inquiry. The first question is whether
Congress has directly decided the precise question at issue; the second
is whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.10 Let us see how
these ideas apply to the AUMF. The analysis is somewhat technical,
but the conclusion is not: the President has broad authority to construe
ambiguities as he sees fit.
A. Chevron Step Zero1
In the aftermath of Chevron, the Court has emphasized the need to
ask a threshold question: do Chevron's deference principles apply at
all? 2 In its important decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,13 the
Court distinguished between two sets of cases in which agency interpretations receive deference: Skidmore 4 cases and Chevron cases.15 In
Skidmore cases, the question of statutory meaning is resolved judicially, but the court will pay attention to what the executive has said,
granting its interpretation "respect according to its persuasiveness."' 6
In Chevron cases, the agency's interpretation is binding unless it vio17
lates either of Chevron's two steps.
Under Mead, Chevron deference applies when "Congress intended"
the executive's action "to carry the force of law.""' Of course Congress
does not usually say with anything approaching clarity whether it so
intends.' 9 In ordinary cases, courts infer a delegation of lawmaking
power from "an agency's [exercise of] power to engage in adjudication
or notice-and-comment rulemaking," or (and this phrase is critical) "by
20
some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.

10

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45

(1984).

11 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2006) (on

file with the Harvard Law School Library).
12 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219-31 (2001).
13 533 U.S. 2 18.
14 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
15 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
16 Id. at 221.
17 Id. at 229. It does matter whether an exercise of authority falls under Skidmore or Chevron,
but the difference should not be overstated. As Skidmore itself illustrates, courts in Skidmore
cases are likely to accept reasonable agency interpretations. See 323 U.S. at 140.
18 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
19 Id. at 229 ("Congress ... may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to
implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the
agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law . .. ." (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984))).
20 Id. at 227.
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How do these points bear on the AUMF? It might be argued that,
in using force under the AUMF, the President is not exercising adjudicatory authority or engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking and hence that his interpretations of the AUMF lack the force of law.
On this view, the precondition for Chevron deference is absent. But if
we step back a bit, we will see that this argument is unconvincing.
Mead does not hold that Chevron deference is unavailable if the
agency has not used adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking;
on the contrary, the Court has made clear that Chevron deference is
sometimes appropriate for informal decisions, and even for those lacking the force of law, if Congress is best read as calling for such deference in light of "the interpretive method used and the nature of the
question at issue. '2 1 Hence, a number of lower court decisions have
given deference to agency interpretations that do not result from any
kind of formal process.2 2 Under Chevron and Mead, the real question
is what were Congress's instructions, and the grant of authority to act
with the force of law is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for
finding a grant of power to interpret ambiguous terms.
In ordinary Chevron cases, delegation of law-interpreting power is
inferred from the authority to produce rules or orders with the force of
law. 23 But with an authorization to use force, what is authorized is the
use of force. 24 Congress knows that the President will construe any
authorization to use force, and it has every incentive to limit his discretion if it so wishes. In cases (i) through (6), the AUMF is best taken,
by its very nature, as an implicit delegation to the President to resolve
ambiguities as he (reasonably) sees fit.2 5 This position tracks Congress's likely expectations, to the extent that they exist; it also imposes
exactly the right incentives on Congress, by requiring it to limit the
President's authority through plain text if that is what it wishes to do.
We may also approach this question from a different direction.
Why, exactly, does Chevron take ambiguities to count as implicit dele21

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-31).

22 See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3 d 1272, 1279-8o (D.C. Cir. 2004); Alfaro v.
Comm'r, 349 F.3 d 225, 228, 231-32 (5 th Cir. 2003); Davis v. EPA, 348 F. 3 d 772, 779 n.5 (9th Cir.

2003).
23 This point makes clear that Chevron stems from an understanding of organic statutes, not
from the Administrative Procedure Act.
24 The authorization likely includes the power to engage in rulemaking or adjudicatory authority insofar as rules and adjudications are necessary or appropriate to the use of force. For
example, the President could surely issue rules governing the detention of enemy combatants.
Any such rules would of course be entitled to Chevron deference.
25 See Barnhart,535 U.S. at 222 (emphasizing the importance of "the nature of the question at
issue" and "the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of
the statute, [and] the complexity of that administration"). These ideas, in an opinion by Justice
Breyer, build directly on the analysis in Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,372-82 (1986).
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gations? The answer lies in an attempted reconstruction of congressional will.26 When Congress has not spoken, interpretations must depend, at least in part, on assessments of the consequences of one or another approach; agencies are in a comparatively good position to make
such assessments. 2 7 And when questions of value are at stake, agencies, subject as they are to presidential control, should resolve those
questions as they see fit. If these are the foundations for Chevron, the
President should have the authority to interpret ambiguities in the
AUMF as he chooses. Interpretation of an authorization to use force
- at least as much as any delegation of authority to agencies, and possibly more - calls for appreciation of consequences and for complex
judgments of value.
B. Chevron Steps One and Two
If Chevron applies, the initial question is "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."2" As Professors Bradley
and Goldsmith emphasize, the President could not use force against
nations or individuals that cannot plausibly be connected with the at-

tacks of September ii,

2001.29

To be sure, the goal of the AUMF is to

permit the President "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." 30 But that goal is to be pursued through a particular means,
which is the use of force against those connected with the attacks of
September i i. Case (3) is therefore a difficult one because the link to
al Qaeda postdates the attacks; hence, the President must resort to
3
complex arguments on behalf of the exercise of force. '
On the other hand, an attack on Iraq in case (i) would have been
permissible under the AUMF in 2003, assuming that the President "de26 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984);
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, go COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2086-87
(199o).
27 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2086.
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
29 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2Io7-o8. A good example of such an unconnected
individual is the GuantAnamo detainee who merely "was 'associated' with an Islamic missionary
group[,]... planned to travel to Pakistan with an individual who later engaged in a suicide
bombing, and.. . accepted free food, lodging, and schooling in Pakistan from an organization
known to support terrorist acts." In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 476
(D.D.C. 2oo5). But cf. id. (recognizing the possibility that the detention was authorized by the
AUMF, but finding it nonetheless violative of due process).
30 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. I07-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(200i).
31 There

are hard questions about whether those who assist al Qaeda can be considered accessories after-the-fact or, as Professors Bradley and Goldsmith argue, cobelligerents. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2112. It is not clear that the analysis of cobelligerents carries over to

the analysis of those who aid a terrorist organization after the occurrence of the acts that are the
predicate for the use of force.

HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2667 2004-2005

2668

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:2663

termined" on the basis of evidence at the time that Iraq assisted al
Qaeda before the September i i attacks. Iran is unquestionably subject to the use of force in case (2). Whenever the meaning of relevant
terms, such as "aided" or "harbored," is disputed, the President has a
great deal of discretion to understand them as he sees fit. Those who
provide financial assistance to al Qaeda, at least with the intention of
doing so, appear to be subject to presidential exercises of force under
step one; hence, presidential action is authorized for case (4).
Under Chevron step two, the question is whether the Executive's
"answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute," which
32
requires a judgment about the reasonableness of that construction.
Turn in this light to case (6). The President may use "all necessary and
appropriate force." An execution of someone who can be detained in"33
stead is gratuitous; it is neither "necessary" nor "appropriate.

II. CANONS AND COUNTERCANONS
Chevron deference can be "trumped" by countercanons. Agencies
are not permitted to interpret statutes to apply outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States.34 Nor are they allowed to interpret
ambiguous statutes to authorize retroactive rulemaking. 35 And an
agency cannot construe an ambiguous statute so as to raise serious
constitutional concerns. 3 6 In these and other contexts, courts have insisted on a series of nondelegation canons that require legislative
rather than merely executive deliberation on the issues in question. 37
By their very nature, the nondelegation canons defeat Chevron deference because they specifically require the nation's lawmakers to make
the relevant decisions explicitly.
A. The Presumption of Liberty
Requirements of clear congressional permission have been a defining feature of American law involving the relationship between liberty

32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Supreme Court has rarely struck down a regulation at step
two, see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-92 (i999), although the D.C. Circuit
does so more frequently, see, e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 76 F 3 d 400, 4o6-o7 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
33 Cf Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 E Supp. 2d at 475 (noting the government's unreasonable assertion of the authority to detain someone who unwittingly donated small sums of money
to an Islamic charity that was actually a front for al Qaeda, and to detain someone "who teaches
English to the son of an al Qaeda member").
34 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (199).
35 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988).
36 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988).
37 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.315 (2000).
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and security in wartime. 38 Consider in this regard Duncan v. Kahanamoku,39 which involved the imposition of martial law in Hawaii
during World War II. The Court concluded that the Hawaii Organic
Act did allow the governor to declare martial law, but it refused to
agree that, as a statutory matter, the governor, even with clear presidential approval, could "close all the courts and supplant them with
military tribunals. '40 The Court acknowledged that the statutory language and history were unclear and emphasized, as relevant to the interpretive question, "the birth, development, and growth of our political institutions. '4 I Because "courts and their procedural safeguards are
indispensable to our system of government," the Court would not construe an ambiguous statute to authorize the displacement, by the Ex42
ecutive, of ordinary courts with military tribunals.
A similar principle underlies one of the most celebrated free speech
decisions in American history: Judge Learned Hand's decision in
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.43 Judge Hand's interpretation of the
Espionage Act as applying only to willfully false materials, and not to
merely subversive materials, forced the legislature, not the Executive
alone, to focus specifically on whether national security justified an
45
abridgment of liberty.44 There are many other examples.
The lesson for the 2001 AUMF, or any AUMF, is straightforward:
the President may not interfere with constitutionally protected interests unless Congress has specifically authorized him to do S0.46 In fact,
this idea played a central role in the decision of the court of appeals in
Padillav. Rumsfeld. 47 At issue was the legality of the detention of an
38 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianismand Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L., Jan. 2004, at 1, 6-9; Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SuP. CT. REV.

47, 77-93.
39
40
41
42

327 U.S. 304 (1946).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 323; see also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (refusing to construe statutory

enactments to permit detention of a concededly loyal Japanese American).
43 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
44 See id. at 542-43.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 354 U.S. 298, 318 0957) (interpreting the Smith Act's prohibition on advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as applicable only to direct incitement); Sunstein, supra note 38.
46 Professors Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the clear statement principles have been applied only in cases involving "presidential actions ... unsupported by historical practice [that]
implicate[] the constitutional rights of U.S. citizen non-combatants." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 6, at 2105. It seems, however, that in at least some circumstances such principles should also
apply in cases involving U.S. citizen combatants or foreigners within the territorial boundaries of
the United States. If, for example, the President attempted to interfere with the religious practices
of either citizen combatants or foreigners, a clear congressional statement should be required.
47 352 F.3 d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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American citizen held as an enemy combatant after having been seized
on American soil.48

In the court's view, Congress's authorization to

use "all necessary and appropriate force" to respond to the September
i i attacks should be understood in light of Ex parte Endo,49 which required a specific congressional statement to support an intrusion into
the domain of liberty.50 The court found no such statement."
In his concurring opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,5 2 Justice Souter
similarly emphasized "the need for a clearly expressed congressional
resolution of the competing claims. '5 3 Not having found any such
resolution, he concluded that Hamdi's detention was unlawful.5 4 The
Hamdi plurality disagreed, but it did not question Justice Souter's
claim that a clear statement was required. It concluded instead that
the AUMF provided that statement, because the detention of "enemy
combatants," at least for the duration of the conflict in which the capture occurred, "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as
to be an exercise of the 'necessary5 and appropriate force' Congress has
5
authorized the President to use."

Justice Souter's view in Hamdi is reasonable, but the plurality's
position seems to me correct, and it is consistent with what I emphasize here: a requirement of legislative clarity for any interference with
constitutionally sensitive interests. In case (5), which is close to
Padillaitself, the question is whether the AUMF contains the requisite
6
clarity. I tend to think it does, but the point is reasonably disputedf.
B. Executive Authority and the Commander-in-ChiefPower
Under the Constitution, the President has "executive" power, and
he is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Perhaps the President
has considerable authority to protect the nation when its security is
57
threatened; perhaps this is a central part of "executive" authority. If
so, then the AUMF should be construed broadly, and in a way that is

48 Id. at 698.
49 323 U.S. 283 (11944).
50 Padilla, 352 F.3 d at 722-23 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, § 2(a), i5 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)) (citing Endo, 323 U.S. at 298-300).
51 Id.
52 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
53 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring

in the judgment).
54 Id.
55 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (plurality opinion) (quoting Authorization for Use of Military
Force, § 2(a), i15Stat. at 224).
56 As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith emphasize, the question of the constitutionality of
detention procedures is independent of the question of authority to detain. Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 6, at 2095.
57

See Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2675 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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highly respectful of presidential prerogatives.5 8 Under this approach,
also conventional in administrative law, statutory enactments involving core executive authority should be construed hospitably to the
President so as to avoid the constitutional difficulties that a narrow
59
construction would introduce.
In recent years, this view is set out most explicitly in Justice Thomas's Hamdi dissent.60 Justice Thomas emphasized that the Constitution accords to the President the "primary responsibility ... to protect
61
the national security and to conduct the Nation's foreign relations."
In support, Justice Thomas might well have cited the Court's decision
in Ex parte Quirin,62 in which the Court upheld the use of military
commissions to try German saboteurs captured during World War 11.63
In that case, the President asked the Court to hold that as Commander-in-Chief, the President had inherent authority to create and
use military tribunals. The Court declined to resolve this argument,
reasoning that Congress had "authorized trial of offenses against the
law of war before such commissions. '64 But where had Congress done
so? The Court relied on Article 15 of the Articles of War;65 but as Professors Bradley and Goldsmith note, Article I5 did not specifically authorize such commissions. 66 Hence the Court's ruling is best seen as
motivated by a desire to avoid ruling on the President's broad claims
about his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief.
Insofar as the AUMF is applied in a context that involves the constitutional powers of the President, it should be interpreted generously.
In this domain, the President receives the kind of super-strong deference that derives from the combination of Chevron with what are
67
plausibly taken to be his constitutional responsibilities.
58 Of course it is possible that executive action could encroach on legislative authority, see, e.g.,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952), but an authorization of
that possibility would take me far beyond the scope of this Reply.
59 See Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 102-03 (1988) (reading statutory removal procedures as
not narrowing executive authority to remove employees for national security reasons); Dep't of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988) (favoring strong deference to the Executive in security-clearance decisions); United States v. Johnson, 48t U.S. 681, 69o-91 (1987) (noting that
suits against the government for injuries related to military service are barred because of the importance of deference to the military). In these cases, the Court did not suggest that Congress
lacks the power to intrude on the President, but its reading of statutes was informed by an appreciation of traditional presidential prerogatives.
60 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2675.
62 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

63 Id. at 48.
64 Id. at 29.

65 See id. at 27 (quoting Article I5 of the Articles of War).
66 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2129-30.

67 1 am not assuming that the President has clear constitutional power to do as he proposes.
Under that assumption, the AUMF would be irrelevant. The question here is how the AUMF
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C. Canons at War
Some of the most difficult cases will arise when the relevant canons
point in opposite directions. Suppose, for example, that the President
makes a reasonable claim of inherent authority to engage in actions
that threaten constitutionally sensitive interests. 6 The question is
whether it is possible to develop rules of priority and harmonization to
sort out the relevant conflicts.
In my view, the answer is straightforward: constitutionally sensitive
rights have a kind of interpretive priority, so the President needs explicit legislative permission to invade them even if he plausibly claims
he is operating in the general domain of his constitutional authority.
Consider the constitutional analogue. Even if the President is acting
in accordance with his inherent power, he remains subject to the constraints established by the rights-protecting provisions of the Constitution. It follows that, for the interpretation of an authorization to use
force, liberty should always receive the benefit of the doubt. This
point strengthens the conclusion that the President cannot act in case
(6), and it helps explain why case (5) is so difficult.
III. CONCLUSION

In war no less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority
can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken with close reference to standard principles of administrative law. These principles accord the President a great deal of discretion to interpret congressional
authorizations for the use of force, subject only to the limits of reasonableness. In short, Chevron has imperialistic aspirations.
The major qualification is the standard one: executive interpretations are constrained by principles that require explicit congressional
deliberation on the question at hand. In the context of national security, this conclusion might seem to give the President less authority
than he needs. But if national security is genuinely at risk, clear congressional authorization will almost certainly be forthcoming.

should be construed when there is a plausible claim - not a holding - that the President has the
constitutional power to act.
68 Of course the likelihood of such conflicts depends on judgments about the merits the
substance of the underlying constitutional principles. If the President has inherent authority to
act in the relevant domains, then no such conflicts will arise, simply because clear statement principles will not be required. Nor will conflicts arise if the Constitution's various safeguards of liberty rarely apply when the AUMF is properly invoked. But let us imagine that, on the correct
view, ambiguous provisions must sometimes be construed in the face of canons pointing in opposite directions.
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